Abstract:The application of probabilistic reasoning to fault diagnosis in linear lightwave networks (LLNs) is investigated. The LLN inference model is represented by a Bayesian network (or causal network). An inference algorithm is proposed that is capable of conducting fault diagnosis (inference) with incomplete evidence and on an interactive basis. Two belief updating algorithms are presented which are used by the inference algorithm for performing fault diagnosis. The first belief updating algorithm is a simplified version of the one proposed by Pearl for singly connected inference models. The second belief updating algorithm applies to multiply connected inference models and is more general than the first. We also introduce a t-fault diagnosis system and an adaptive diagnosis system to further reduce the computational complexity of the fault diagnosis process.
Introduction
The complexity of communication networks and the volume of information provided by these networks have caused an increase in demand for network management systems and personnel. In particular, the area of network fault management requires a great deal of network expertise (design, operation, management, etc.) which has proved to be difficult to acquire and maintain. The application of expert, or knowledge-based, systems to attack the inherent complexity of network fault management (e.g., NDS [12] , YES/MVS [13] , ACE [14] , Troubleshooter [15] , and ISM [16] ) is a growing effort . However, most of the network fault management systems were built on an ad-hoc and unstructured basis. The research on network fault management is still in its infancy. There is a pressing need, therefore, for establishing a theoretical foundation of network fault management and for bridging the gap between research and working systems. Fig. 1 presents a generic network fault diagnosis system architecture. The fault diagnosis system is data-driven and operates in real-time. It consists of four parts: the alarm acquisition system, the event manager, the inference engine, and the knowledge base. The alarm acquisition system gathers the network status information (alarm messages) from on-line monitors, and passes them to the event manager. The event manager filters the alarm messages according to certain criteria. The filtered messages, called evidence, are used as the input to the inference engine. The inference engine conducts fault diagnosis based on the available evidence and the knowledge base according to certain inference algorithms. The knowledge base represents our knowledge about the network under consideration.
Fig. 1 A generic network fault diagnosis system architecture
Due to the distributed nature of communication networks the relationships between fault patterns and network events is often inexact and the conclusions are uncertain [17] . Moreover, unavailability, loss or delay of network messages require the fault diagnosis system to have the ability to conduct inference with incomplete data. To quote from [18] , "to deal with the increasing network complexities, most existing approaches have adopted classical logic by designating each network (fault) proposition with a definite truth. However, this proves insufficient in dealing with incompleteness of network information". For reasoning with such imprecise information and relationships, it is highly desirable for the inference engine to have the capability to conduct inference with uncertainty (or reasoning using probabilities). Over the last few years, reasoning using probabilities has become very popular within the AI community. For introductions to this area as well as reviews on its recent developments the reader is directed to [19] and [20] . Most recently, applications of probabilistic reasoning in network fault management have begun to appear in the literature. Network fault recognition using probabilistic data and machine learning was studied by Maxion [21] . Work on incorporating non-deterministic reasoning in managing heterogeneous network faults was investigated by Hong and Sen [18] . Network host-level fault diagnosis by reasoning in nested evidence spaces was studied by Dawes and Pagurek [22] . In this paper, we present a probabilistic approach to fault diagnosis in linear lightwave networks (LLNs) [1] . Here we define "fault diagnosis" as the identification of fault types and the isolation of faults to correctable network components. LLN fault diagnosis has been studied by Schroff and Schwartz using deterministic approaches [2] . It was assumed there that at most one faulty component can occur at any time (while no such restriction is imposed in our approach). The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we illustrate, by using a simple example, how to derive the inference model (i.e., the knowledge base) for LLN fault diagnosis. The inference model is a Bayesian network, i.e., a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where the nodes are random variables and certain independence assumptions hold [3] , [4] , [19] . In Section 3, we give an inference algorithm that is performed by the inference engine during the fault diagnosis process. A step-by-step illustration of the inference algorithm is presented by working through the fault diagnosis process for the example LLN. The inference algorithm makes use of a certain belief updating algorithm to calculate the belief functions for every LLN basic network component (BNC). Two belief updating algorithms are presented in Section 4. Section 4.1 and the Appendix summarizes the belief updating algorithm for a singly connected inference model originally proposed by Pearl [3] , [4] . Pearl's algorithm is then modified to make it especially suitable for the LLN application. Belief updating for multiple-connected Bayesian networks has been shown to be NP-hard (see Section 4.2). A new belief updating algorithm for multiple-connected inference models is proposed in Section 4.3 by taking advantage of the special features of the LLN inference model. It is shown that the complexity of the new algorithm is O(K L ) in the worst case, where K is the number of LLN BNCs and L is the number of available evidences. To further simplify the belief function computation, we propose in Section 5 the concepts of t-fault diagnosis system and adaptive fault diagnosis system. We show that the t-fault diagnosis system reduces to the Algorithm 2 of [2] if t = 1 and the a priori probabilities of failure of the LLN BNCs are all equal. Finally, Section 6 contains our concluding remarks.
The Inference Model
The linear lightwave network (LLN) constitutes the physical layer of ACORN [1], [2], a gigabit research network testbed. It is a new type of architecture for lightwave networks based on establishing controllable transparent optical paths among network users. The LLN is based on a single key component: a controllable linear divider/combiner (LDC). By appropriately controlling the settings of LDCs placed at each network node, internal connections between input and output ports of an LDC can be set up, and as a result, optical paths (also called routes) on which many signals are multiplexed can be created on demand. For a detailed introduction to LLNs, the reader is directed to [1] . A simple LLN with five LDCs is shown in Fig. 2 . Each LDC has a number of input and output ports and LDCs are interconnected by optical links. In Fig. 2 , the symbols ijk and ojl denote, respectively, the k-th input port and the l-th output port of LDC j; a capital letter with subscript p associated with each port denotes the optical input (output) power value to (from) that port (e.g., B p denotes the output power value from port o21 as well as the input power value to port i41); and finally, Ipi and Opk denote, the input and output power values to/from the LLN periphery, respectively. We make the following assumptions in our model:
1. The observed messages are the LDC input and output power values. Faults are detected when the observed values deviate from the expected range of power values. We assume to have reliable information about the range of power values under normal operation of each LDC in the LLN. Once a power value falls outside its specified operating range, a fault is said to have occurred. 2. The Basic Network Components (BNCs) are LDCs. That is, LDCs are treated as black boxes and are the elementary units (atoms) for the network fault manager.
If an LDC has failed or some part of it has failed, all its output power values will be incorrect (outside the specified range) but its input power values remain unaf-fected. We assume that the optical links between LDCs are not subject to failure. This is not really a restriction because we can model a link as a one-input/ one-output "LDC" which is subject to failure. Thus, the set of BNCs also includes the optical links.
Fig. 2 An Example of a LLN
3. The network routes are considered to be quasi-static. That is, the network configuration changes very slowly --connections that are established remain up for a long time when compared with the time required to carry out the fault diagnosis. 4 . All inbound signals at any LDC originate from mutually independent sources. This is referred to as the mutually independent sources (MIS) assumption [1].
The LLN routes/connections determine the internal connections between the input and the output ports of every LDC. Thus, this routing information is required by the fault diagnosis system for constructing the inference model. Assuming the routing table as given in Table 1 , the internal connections of each LDC are shown in Fig. 2 by dotted lines. Hence, Fig. 2 summarizes the network configuration, which together with the above four assumptions constitutes our knowledge about the LLN. The inference model is constructed based on this knowledge. 
Similarly, for each LDC we define a binary-valued RV,
Furthermore, we assume that the N j 's are mutually independent RVs with probability distribution .
With the above RVs so defined, based on Fig. 2 and the assumptions 1 and 2, the following dependence relations among the RVs are obvious:
where ^ denotes the logical "AND" operation. The dependence relations in (4) can be graphically represented as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which each node represents a RV (Fig. 3) . For a non-root RV X in the DAG of Fig. 3 , X and its parents U 1 , ..., U n are related by .
The conditional probability P(x | u1, ..., un) (for a RV X, we denote its value by the lower case letter x) is then given by 
which is the probabilistic representation of the dependence relation given in (5). Fig. 3 The Bayesian Network for the LLN The DAG in Fig. 3 and the probability distributions of (3) and (6) constitute the inference model for the LLN of Fig. 2 . This inference model is an example of the so called Bayesian networks [3] , [4] . The inference model captures the knowledge required for LLN fault diagnosis; hence, it is the knowledge base to be consulted by the inference engine in carrying out fault diagnosis. To recap, the procedure described above applies to the construction of an inference model for any LLN. Given an LLN, the internal connections of every LDC may be determined from the LLN's routing table. Consider an LDC, say LDC k, with n input ports and m output ports. Denote its input and output power values by U p1 , .., U pn , and X p1 , ..., Xpm, respectively (see also Figure 6 ). We form an mxn matrix T k , called the internal connection matrix of LDC k, as follows: t ij = 1 if there exists a connection between the j-th input port and the i-th output port and t ij = 0 otherwise. Then the dependence relation between the corresponding binary variables X i , U j 's and N k is given by (7) Based on this dependence relationship, the corresponding inference model can be obtained as in the above example. This process can be easily automated for arbitrary network configurations.
The Inference Algorithm
The RVs in the inference model of an LLN (see Fig. 3 ) can be classified into two types: observable and unobservable. The power related RVs such as A, I 1 , O 1 belong to the first type, since their values can be determined from measuring the corresponding power values. On the other hand, LDC related RVs such as N j are of the second type because we have treated an LDC as a black box. The task of the LLN fault diagnosis system is to infer, based on the values (i.e., instantiations) of the observable RVs, the values of the
unobservable RVs. Refering now to Figure 1 , the fault diagnosis process for LLNscan be briefly summarized as follows: network monitors measure the values of optical powers and forward them to the management agent. The messages will be filtered by the management agent. Only those messages which indicate possible network faults are passed to the inference engine. Messages received at the inference engine are called evidence for network faults. Based on this evidence and the inference model, the inference engine computes its belief that an LDC has failed using the inference algorithm to be presented in this section. If the fault diagnosis system were supplied with power measurements at all the LDCs, fault diagnosis would be a trivial process; however, power measurements, or evidence gathering, is usually an expensive process. To minimize the cost in evidence gathering, we assume that power measurements are only performed at the input and output ports of the LLN under normal network operation; power measurements at LDCs are conducted only if additional evidence is needed in order to complete the fault diagnosis process. Here the LLN input ports are defined as all the LDC's input ports where network routes originate and the LLN output ports are defined as all the LDC's output ports where the network routes terminate. Note that, by monitoring the LLN input and output power values, any LDC failures within the LLN can be detected. The above arguments suggest that the inference algorithm must have the following two features: 1. It should be able to conduct inference with incomplete evidence and be able to identify the faulty LDC or a plausible set of faulty LDCs. 2. It should perform inference on an interactive basis. Initially it should identify a plausible subset based on the currently available evidence. Then with this subset as a guide, it should decide what additional evidence needs to be acquired. With the new evidence, it should narrow down the possible set of faulty LDCs and finally pinpoint the BNCs.
With respect to the LLN inference model, the evidence is a set of instantiated RVs, W = {W 1 = w 1 , ..., W L = w L } which are derived from power measurements. For example, if measurement indicates that the power value W pl is incorrect, then W l = 0. The belief function of an LDC related RV N j , is defined as
The belief function tells us the likelihood that the RV N j takes value 0 or 1. Therefore, b(N j =0) is the likelihood that LDC j has failed. We illustrate the above concepts with a fault diagnosis example for the LLN in Fig. 2 .
Example 1.
For the LLN in Fig. 2 , suppose that LDC 1 and LDC 5 have failed simultaneously. We also assume that the LLN input power Ip1 and Ip2 are both correct; for otherwise fault sources will be in the transmitters which are outside of the LLN. Due to the failures of LDCs 1 and 5, the observed LLN output power values Op1 and Op3 will be both incorrect and Op2 will be correct. Therefore the evidence is
May 1992 = 0}. The job of the inference engine is to locate the fault sources, i. e., N1 = N5 = 0, based on the evidence W. This is achieved in an iterative fashion. Since O2 = 1, all the ancestors of O2, i.e., N4, C, N3, and I2, must also have value 1. Therefore, O2 and all its ancestors can be eliminated from the inference model in Fig. 3 . Similarly, I1 can be deleted. For the purpose of fault diagnosis, therefore, we need only to work with the trimmed inference model shown in Fig. 4 (a). For simplicity, assume that for all i. Then b(N 1 = 0) and b(N 2 = 0) achieve the maximum of all the belief functions. In other words, LDCs 1 and 2 are the most probable failed LDCs which have caused the evidence W. We arbitrarily select LDC 2 for further probing. Measuring the input and output power values at LDC 2 will reveal that they are all incorrect. This corresponds to A = B = 0 in Fig. 4(a) . This measurement does not tell us anything directly about the status of LDC 2. Iteration 2. Now the evidence available to us is updated to W ={A = 0, B = 0, O1 = 0, O3 = 0}. For this simple model we immediately recognize that N1 = 0, i.e., LCD 1 has failed. However, to illustrate the diagnosis process, we proceed with the belief function calculation based on the updated evidence. Simple calculations using Bayes formula show that , , and . Therefore, we are certain that LDC 1 has failed. Iteration 3. With LDC 1 being repaired, the updated evidence becomes W = {N1 = 1, O1 = 1, O3 = 0}. Since O1 = 1, O1 and all its ancestors can be removed from Fig. 4(a) . The resulting inference model is now as shown in Fig. 4(b) . The evidence in Fig. 4(b) is W = {O3 = 0}.
The belief function calculated based on Fig. 4 (b) and the evidence W is . Hence, LDC 5 has failed. After LDC 5 is repaired. Power measurement at the LLN output will be all correct. Therefore, no more faults are detected.
The above example shows one important step in the LLN fault diagnosis process --trimming of the inference model --an operation that can significantly simplify belief function calculations. Given the evidence, W = {W 1 = w 1 , ..., W L = w L }, if w i = 1, then the RV W i and all its ancestors can be deleted from the inference model. The inference engine needs only to conduct its inference on the trimmed inference model. We are now ready to present the inference algorithm for LLN fault diagnosis.
Algorithm 1. (LLN fault diagnosis algorithm.)
Step 1. Read the input and output power values at the periphery of the LLN:
• •If Ni was not marked "uncertain" in the previous iteration, let k = i; go to step 3;
•If Ni was marked "uncertain" in the previous iteration, remove the mark; find N k with the second largest belief; go to step 3. Algorithm 1 did not include the belief updating part. This is discussed in the next section.
Belief Updating Algorithms
In this section general belief updating algorithms will be discussed. In section 4.1 Pearl's belief updating algorithm and its limitations are briefly mentioned. For the benefit of the reader the algorithm is presented in the Appendix. In section 4.2 belief updating for mul-
tiply connected inference models is described. A new belief updating algorithm for multiply connected inference models is presented in section 4.3.
1 Belief Updating for Singly Connected Inference Models
Since our inference model for fault diagnosis of LLNs is a Bayesian network, the core operation in the diagnosis algorithm presented in the last section is the belief function computation also known as belief updating. Belief updating for general Bayesian networks has been proven to be NP-hard [5] . For singly connected Bayesian networks (namely, networks with no more than one path between any two RVs), the belief updating can be done in polynomial time [3] , [4] . Note that the trimmed inference model shown in Fig. 4(a) is singly connected. In the Appendix, we summarized Pearl's belief updating algorithm for singly connected Bayesian networks [3] , [4] and call it Algorithm 2. Pearl's algorithm deals directly with the conditional probability P(x | u1, ..., un), which is a matrix assuming all nodes are binary valued. For the LLN inference model, the conditional probability is given in (6) . Using this fact, the computations in the belief updating algorithm can be simplified considerably. Specifically, it is straightforward to show that, the equations (36) and (37) (see the Appendix) can be reduced to: (9) and (10) respectively.
2 Belief Updating for Multiply Connected Inference Models
Pearl's belief updating algorithm discribed in the appendix cannot be applied to multiply connected Bayesian networks . A multiply connected Bayesian network is evidenced by the presence of loops. Here, loops are defined as undirected cycles in the underlying network. The inference model in Fig. 3 is multiply connected. There is one loop in this model, formed by the nodes B, O1, N4, O2, C, O3, and B. There are three general approaches of belief updating for multiply connected Bayesian networks: clustering, conditioning, and simulation [3] , [4] . Clustering involves forming compound nodes in such a way that the resulting network of clusters is singly connected. For example, the model in Fig. 3 becomes singly connected if we cluster the nodes B, O1, N4, O2, and C into a compound node. Every Bayesian network can be structured as singly connected if we do not limit the size of the clusters. Unfortunately, in the LLN case, the sizes of the clusters can be quite large, and the structureless nature of the compound node makes it difficult to compute, much less explain, the belief functions with the clustered nodes. For this reason, clustering is not a feasible approach for the LLN.
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The simulation technique provides an approximate solution to the belief functions. It uses Monte Carlo techniques to estimate probabilities by counting how frequently events occur in a series of simulation runs. The first simulation method, called logic sampling, was proposed by Henrion [6] . In logic sampling, simulation starts at the root nodes and ends at leaf nodes. A value is assigned to each root node based on its prior probability. Once root nodes have been assigned values, their children are assigned values based on the conditional probabilities relating the root nodes to their children. This process of setting values of the children based on the values of their parents and the related conditional probabilities continues until all the nodes in the network have been assigned values. The assignment of a value to each node in the network constitutes one simulation cycle.
Logic sampling applies to any Bayesian network; however, it does not permit evidence nodes to be clamped to their known values, unless they just happen to be root nodes.
Since the simulation proceeds in a top-down fashion, there is no way to account for nonroot node evidence known to have occurred until the nodes corresponding to these evidences are sampled. If the assigned values match the evidence, the simulation cycle is then counted as one positive instance of the simulation; otherwise, it must be discarded.
To get a reasonable approximation to the belief function, the process is repeated until enough positive instances are generated to be statistically significant. In those cases where there are a large number of instantiated nodes, many repetitions may be needed to produce just one positive instance [6] . The stochastic simulation method proposed by Pearl [7] accounts for the evidence in the sampling process. It permanently clamps the evidence nodes to the values observed and then conducts the stochastic simulation on the clamped network. Although the stochastic simulation method seems to work well with Bayesian networks with nodes that are not highly dependent on each other, it is liable to convergence problems when the network contains links that are nearly deterministic. Therefore, it can not be applied to the LLN inference model where the links are deterministic. Chin & Cooper [8] have proposed logic sampling with evidential integration, which employs link reversal to convert non-root evidence nodes to root nodes. However, this does not seem to be a general approach since the link reversal process is liable to combinatorial problems. More recently, other simulation approaches have been investigated, such as the likelihood weighting technique by Fung &Chang [9] , and the importance sampling technique by Shachter & Peot [10] . While the convergence properties of these two approaches seem hard to predict, their numerical results suggest that they work well even for networks with extreme values. The applicability of the latter two techniques to the LLN model remains an open problem. The third method, conditioning, involves breaking the loops by instantiating a selected set of nodes to render the network singly connected, so that Pearl's belief updating algorithm can be applied [3] , [4] . In Fig. 3 , for example, instantiating N4 will render the rest of the network singly connected. Given the evidence W, we instantiate N4 for each of its values. Then propagate the evidence W, using Pearl's algorithm, under each of the instantiations of N4. The belief functions, say b(n3) of N3, can be obtained by ,
where and are the belief functions obtained by instantiating
N 4 to 0 and 1, respectively. Using Bayes rule, we have (12) where is a normalizing constant, P(n4) is the a priori probability of N 4 , and P(W | n 4 ) can be obtained by propagating the instantiation of N4 to n 4 through a singly connected network.
In the LLN inference model, the nodes are all binary-valued. If a model contains J loops, one node in each loop needs to be instantiated. Therefore, the amount of computation is approximately equal to the execution of Pearl's algorithm for singly connected networks. If the number of loops is not too large, say around five, conditioning would be a possible approach for the LLN application.
3 A Belief Updating Algorithm for LLNs
In what follows, we present a belief updating algorithm for a multiply connected LLN inference model. The computational complexity of the algorithm is O(K L ) in the worst case, where K is the number of Nj's in the trimmed inference model and L is the number of nodes instantiated to value 0. As illustrated in the last section, given the evidence
we can always trim the inference model by detecting the node W l and all its ancestors from the original model. Therefore, without loss of generality, we assume that W = {W 1 = 0, ..., W L = 0}. For LDC j, we denote the event Nj=0 by nj and Nj=1 by ¬nj. From (3), we have that .
and the nj's are mutually independent events. For each in the evidence W = {W 1 = 0, ..., W L = 0}, define the set .
Note that any single event in alone can determine the instantiation of Wl to 0. Set is not empty since there must be a cause for the faulty power output at . The righthand side of (14) can be interpreted as a disjunction of events nj. Therefore, conjunction of for l = 1, 2, ..., L gives the set of all possible joint events that each causes the instantiation of W. Let .
Using laws of Boolean algebra, we can rewrite (15) into the irreducible disjunctive normal form (DNF), i.e., into a set of disjunctions of conjunctions of basic events in which each disjunct contains no identical basic events and no disjunct is a subset of the other. The belief function of given W can, therefore, be expressed as: (16) since the sets and are probabilistically equivalent.
nj| Nj has a path to
Consider the trimmed inference model of Fig. 4 (a) with evidence W = {O1 = 0, O3 = 0}. The sets and are as follows: (17) From (15), we have .
and the irreducible DNF of it is:
. (19) Using (16), we obtain: (20) and similarly, .
The belief updating algorithm to be presented below consists of L+1 steps.
Step 0 finds the sets ,; steps 1 to L-1 find the irreducible set recursively; and the last step computes the belief functions. The proof of the correctness of steps 1 to L-1 is straightforward but tedious; therefore, it is omitted. In what follows, we will use to denote set operations, and to denote Boolean operations.
Algorithm 3. (Belief Updating Algorithm for LLNs.)
Step 0. Given the inference model and the evidence W = {W1 = 0, ..., WL = 0}, compute by finding all ancestors of that are LDC RVs.
Step 1. Find the intersection of and , , let .
Step l (for 1 < l < L-1).
(a) find the generalized intersection of and , .
In other words, contains those joint events in that contain some events in . (b) Let .
(24)
(c) As we shall see later, the set thus obtained may not be in the irreducible DNF form. Some joint events in it might contain some other joint events in the same set. The former should be eliminated. This can be done by arranging the joint events in in increasing cardinality order and then scan from the smallest upwards checking for proper containment. The resulting set is in the irreducible DNF form.
Step L. Compute and compute using (16) .
Note that Step l (c) is necessary because
Step l (b) does not necessarily return an irreducible DNF form. Here is an example: Let ,
. It is easy to see that this can be the case for some LLN. Now, by (23), , and by (24), in which the joint event is redundant.
If an element in is a joint event of k basic events, we say that the element has multiplicity k. In particular, if k = 1, it is called a singleton. Note that, if all the elements in are all singletons, then the generalized intersection defined in (23) reduces to the ordinary intersection. Now we estimate the worst case time complexity of this algorithm. Recall that we have K LDC nodes and L output ports whose power measurements are incorrect. In
Step 0, to compute each , it takes at most amount of time to traverse the DAG. Thus, this step takes at most amount of time. In
Step all three sub-sets (a), (b) and (c) take time proportional to the size and . The former is bounded by and the latter by . Thus, Steps 1 through L-1 take at most amount of time.
Step L takes a time proportional to the size of which is bounded by . Therefore, in the worst case the entire algorithm takes amount of time. The worst case bound is not very good, but as we will see in the next secction, this method will allow us to come up with a better average case algorithm.
The t-Fault Diagnosis System and Adaptive Fault Diagnosis System
A fault diagnosis system employing Algorithm 1 in conjunction with Algorithm 2 or 3 is capable of identifying any number of faults in the LLN. Hence, we call such systems general fault diagnosis systems. In a practical LLN, simultaneous failures of a large number of LDCs is very unlikely. Consider, for example, an LLN with 100 LDCs. Assuming that the a priori probability of LDC failure is , the probabilities of 1, 2, and 3 LDC failures are , , and , respectively. Therefore, for practical purposes, it is worthwhile to consider fault diagnosis systems with more limited fault × diagnosis capabilities. In this section we introduce the concept of t-fault identification capability for an inference system, and show that the computational complexity of a tfault identification algorithm is on the order of O(K t ) in the worst case. A fault diagnosis system is said to have a t-fault diagnosis capability if it is designed to identify all fault patterns with t or fewer LDC failures and we call such systems t-fault diagnosis systems. We observe that if all the fault patterns have t or fewer faults, then the corresponding element in the irreducible set will be of multiplicity at most t. The tfault diagnosis system conducts its inference using Algorithm 1 and a modified version of Algorithm 3. The basic idea of the modified Algorithm 3 is as follows.
Step 0 remain the same as in Algorithm 3. In Step (b), when forming set we discard all those joint events that have more than t basic events. We denote the resulting set of step l (c) by . As the result, the final as well as all intermediate 's will contain only joint events of multiplicity less or equal to t.
Step L also remains the same as in Algorithms 3:
Following the same complexity analysis of Algorithm 3, we can see that the worst case time complexity of the t-fault diagnosis algorithm is at most . Note that this is a significant reduction in time complexity since it is now a polynomial in the size of the LLN. During the steps l=1, 2, ..., L-1, set might be found to be empty. This means that no t or less faults can cause the given evidence. In other words, the actual number of faults must be larger than t, and such fault patterns can not be identified by the t-fault diagnosis algorithm. In this case, an alarm will be raised to inform the higher levels where appropriate actions will be taken to deal with this problem. The analysis above shows that by restricting to t faults, the inference process takes less time. Therefore, there is a trade-off between the fault-diagnosis capability and the computational complexity. As a special case, when t=1, finding is particularly simple:
.
It can be shown that if the a priori probabilities p i are all identical, the 1-fault diagnosis system becomes the deterministic fault diagnosis system presented in [2].
Example 3
Consider an LLN with its inference model as shown in Fig. 5(a) . Assume that the LLN input power values are all correct and that LDCs 1 and 3 have failed. Then the evidence for this inference model will be W = { I1 = 1, I2 = 1, O1 = 0, O2 = 0 }. The nodes I1 and I2 . Assuming that , for all i, then b(1, n 1 ) and b(1, n 3 ) are the maximum. If LDC 1 is selected for power measurement, we will find that it has failed and will need to be repaired. Iteration 2. The updated evidence is . After deleting node A and its ancestor N 1 , the trimmed inference mode is shown in Fig. 5(b) . The evidence corresponding to Fig. 5(b) is . We have , and
. Thus , , , and
. Then, , , and . After LDC 3 is fixed, the LLN output levels will be all correct and hence, no further faults are detected. B) Assuming that the general fault diagnosis system is used, we proceeds as follows: Iteration 1. and will be the same as in iteration 1 of A 
are the maximum. If LDC 1 is selected, we will find that it has failed and have it repaired. Iteration 2. The same as in A).
Note that the 1-fault diagnosis system corrects the two faults for this LLN. Also note that, the belief functions b(1, n j ) and b(n j ) are generally different due to the omission of larger joint events in the modified version of the Algorithm 3. If the a priori probabilities , the effects of the difference between the two sets of belief functions to the inference process becomes negligible. The general fault diagnosis system is capable of identifying any faults patterns but requires a larger amount of computations; while a t-fault diagnosis system has a limited fault identification capability with a lower computational complexity. A good balance between the two can be obtained by designing an adaptive fault diagnosis system. The adaptive fault diagnosis system proposed here uses an adaptive inference algorithm that runs the modified version of Algorithm 3 with increasing t values. More precisely, it starts with t=1. If the set is not empty, it computes BEL(t, nj) and conducts the inference process as described by Algorithm 1. Only when the set is found to be empty, it increases t by one and restarts the modified Algorithm 3 again. It repeats this until it finds a non-empty . To analyze the time complexity of this adaptive inference algorithm, we assume that in some instance of execution there are actually T faults. In the worst case, the algorithm will find all for are empty. But for , it will find a non-empty .
As shown above, for each , the algorithm takes amount of time and the last step takes . Therefore, it takes at most amount of time when there are exactly T faults. Normally, each LDC has limited fan-out. Therefore, the number of output nodes L should be bounded by a constant times K the number of LDCs. Thus, the time complexity of the algorithm is for T faults. Assuming that the a priori failure probabilities of the LDCs are all equal to p, then the average time complexity of the algorithm is at most .
(27) When , the above quantity is bounded by a constant. In other words, whenever some fault occurs, the adaptive inference algorithm would spend, on average, a constant amount of time to compute the belief function, independent of the size of the network as long as . As an example, for a 100 node LLN, p has to be smaller than , a reasonable assumption. 
Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a probabilistic approach to fault diagnosis in LLNs. A generic network fault diagnosis system architecture was introduced which consists of an alarm acquisition system, an event manager, an inference engine, and a knowledge base. The knowledge base, or the inference model, summarizes our knowledge required to perform fault diagnosis on LLNs and is represented by a Bayesian network. This knowledge representation is both concise and powerful. It enabled us to derive an inference algorithm capable of performing inference with incomplete evidence and on an interactive basis. The inference algorithm relies on the computation of belief functions of the LLN BNCs. The belief functions are then used to guide focusing the system on the faulty network components. Two belief updating algorithms were proposed. The first algorithm is based on a belief updating algorithm for singly connected Bayesian networks originally proposed by Pearl. The second algorithm is more general than the first one and applies to multiple-connected inference models. Belief updating for multiply connected Bayesian networks has been shown to be NP-hard; the complexity of the second algorithm is on the order of O(K L ) in the worst case, where K is the number of BNCs in the LLN and L is the number of evidences available to the inference engine. To further reduce the computational complexity, we proposed the t-fault diagnosis system and the adaptive fault diagnosis system. The t-fault diagnosis system works well for any LLN having t or fewer BNC faults. Its complexity is on the order of O(K t ) in the worst case. The adaptive diagnosis system starts with the 1-fault diagnosis system, and then increases its fault diagnosis capability gradually until all faults are identified. As a result, the average time complexity of this algorithm is constant, i.e., independent of the size of the LLN and the number of evidences as long as the failure probability of the BNCs is small. Note that the time complexity of the proposed fault diagnosis systems may be significantly less than the worst case estimation, as evidenced by the LLN fault diagnosis examples given in the paper. Another important performance measure of the fault diagnosis systems is the average number of LDC power measurements required to isolate a faulty BNCs. However, this number depends highly on the LLN topology, existing connections as well as the a priori probabilities of failure; therefore, an analytical expression on this average number seems infeasible. The analysis on special topologies and simulation studies on randomly generated instances should be possible and will be investigated in the future.
Appendix
This appendix presents Pearl's belief updating algorithm. Pearl's algorithm is distributed in nature, with each node/RV of the Bayesian network regarded as an individual processor. Each node performs local computations and the results are communicated only between neighboring nodes. A typical fragment of the singly connected Bayesian network is shown in Fig. 6 along with the messages to be passed between neighboring nodes. In this figure, node X has n parents U1,..., Un, m children, Y1, ..., Ym. The conditional probability P(x | u1, ..., un) quantitatively relates the node X to its parents. Let WXYj denote the evidence contained in the sub-network on the head side of the link 
is the current strength of the causal support contributed by incoming link Ui -> X, and the message (29) is the current strength of the diagnostic support contributed by each outgoing link X -> Yj.
Algorithm 2. (Pearl's belief updating algorithm [3] , [4] .)
A node X is activated when it receives the messages from its parents, or the messages from its children, or the node itself is instantiated for a specific value x. Upon the activation, X performs the following three steps in any order.
Step1: Belief updating. The node X updates its belief measure to is the value of node X, and where is a normalizing constant rendering Note that, (34)--(36) implies that BEL(x) = 1 if X is instantiated for x and 0 if X is instantiated, but not for x.
Step 2: Bottom-up propagation. The node X computes new messages and posts them to its parents:
(33)
Step 3: Top-down propagation. The node X computes new messages and posts them to its children:
(34)
The above algorithm needs to be initialized by the following procedures:
1. Set all values, messages, and messages to 1; 2. For all roots U, set ; 3. or all roots U and for all children X of U, the node U posts new messages to X,
Initially, when no evidence is available, the probability distribution embedded in the Bayesian network is in equilibrium. Upon the instantiation of a node (i. e., the arrival of a new piece of evidence), the equilibrium state is broken. In order for the network to enter a new equilibrium state (i. e., the belief functions converge to their true values), the number of belief updates to be performed by each node is proportional to the diameter of the Bayesian network [3] . 
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